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Judicial Review of the Administrative Denial
of Employment Certification to Aliens
INTRODUCTION
LOBODAN PERERA, a citizen of Yugoslavia, was denied employ-
ment certification by the U.S. Labor Department. The
certification was necessary in order to receive an immigrant visa. 1
The employment certification is a determination and a certifica-
tion by the Secretary of Labor to the Secretary of State and the
Attorney General that there is not a sufficient number of American
workers who are able, willing, qualified and available at the time
of the application and at the place where the alien intends to work,
and that employment of such aliens would not adversely affect the
wages and working conditions of similarly employed American
workers.2
Slobodan Perera entered the United States under a student
visa to study at the University of Colorado as a graduate student
in electrical' engineering. In 1972, he started working for Xytex
Corporation as a part time computer programmer.3 On Septem-
ber 19, 1973, Perera and Xytex Corporation applied for his em-
ployment certification. The application specified that the re-
quirements for the job were a Master of Science degree, study
concentration in electrical engineering and computer science, and
three years of practical experience in the field. Perera was the
only one available who met those requirements. 4
The application was filed with the office of the Regional Man-
power Administration, the local representative of' the Secretary of
Labor. That office, after communicating with engineering teach-
ers and a placement service, took it upon itself to decide that a
Bachelor's degree in electrical engineering would constitute suf-
ficient qualification for the position with Xytex Corporation,
and that there were Americans available meeting that qualifica-
tion. On this basis Perera was denied employment certifica-
tion. 5
I Xytex Corp. v. Schliemann, 382 F. Supp. 50, 51 (D. Col. 1974).
2 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(14) (1970).
3 382 F. Supp. at 51.
Id. at 51-52.
s Id. at 52.
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After a requested review the application was again denied, and
a complaint was filed with the District Court by Xytex Corpora-
tion and Perera.6  The District Court in Xytex Corporation v.
Schliemann decided that judicial review was allowed in this case
under the Administrative Procedure Act (hereinafter referred to
as A.P.A.) because the administrative agency (Regional Man-
power Administration) had abused its discretion.7  In deciding
the case upon the merits, the court found that in denying the
certification the Manpower Administration acted without collect-
ing the necessary facts. The case was remanded to the agency for
more detailed consideration. 8
In a similar case, Reddy Inc. v. United States Department of Labor,
the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case of
Dhekney, an alien from India, whose application for employment
certification was denied.9 Dhekney's job was described in his ap-
plication as an "engineering design specialist in light gauge
metals." 10 The court held that the decisions of the Secretary of
Labor denying aliens labor certification were subject to limited
judicial review." In deciding the case upon the merits, the court
remanded it, holding the findings of the Secretary of Labor
against Dhekney arbitrary as regarded both the availability of
workers and the effect of Dhekney's employment on American
wages. 12
The first important issue discussed in this note is the right
to judicial review of decisions of the Secretary of Labor denying
labor certification to an alien. The courts, until Reddy, followed
the view that judicial review was allowed when there was abuse of
discretion on the part of the Secretary of Labor in denying labor
certification. Reddy takes a more liberal view, holding that be-
cause of lack of contrary legislative intent (in the Immigration
and Nationality Act) the courts have the right to review without
first having to determine whether there was abuse of Administra-
tive discretion.i3
Under the issue of judicial review the question of the standing
6 Id.
7 Id. at 53.
8 Id.
Reddy, Inc. v. United States Dep't of Labor, 492 F.2d 538 (5th Cir. 1974).
lo id. at 540.
11 Id. at 542-544.
12 Id. at 545.
13 See notes 46-47 infra and text following.
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of an alien also frequently arises. The courts have held that an
alien outside the United States, and not on the border or on a
ship coming into the country, has no standing to challenge the
decision of the Secretary of Labor.14 However, an alien at the
border has standing. for a writ of habeas corpus, while an alien in
the United States has standing for full review of the decision of the
Secretary of Labor."
The second issue in this article focuses upon the court's power
to remand the decision of the Secretary of Labor denying an
alien employment certification. In such cases the courts have
strictly construed the Immigration and Nationality Act, and they
have reversed and remanded decisions which did not follow the ex-
act terms of the statute in the determination of whether the alien's
Job would adversely affect American wages. 16
It is the purpose of this note to analyze the procedural and sub-
stantive administrative problems arising from the decisions of the
Secretary of Labor denying aliens employment certification, and
the courts' attempts to review such decisions.
STATUTORY REQUIREMENTS
An alien may apply for an immigrant visa and permanent resi-
dence in the United States under the Immigration and Nationality
Act of 1952.17 The Act creates six preferences for granting an im-
migrant visa: first, unmarried sons or daughters of citizens; sec-
ond, spouses, unmarried sons or daughters of aliens lawfully ad-
mitted for permanent residence; third, professional preference;
fourth, married sons and daughters of citizens; fifth, brothers or
sisters of citizens; sixth, skilled and unskilled labor. 18  Skilled
workers and professionals come under both the third and sixth
preferences. 19 In order to receive a visa under the third or sixth
preference, an alien must ask the Secretary of Labor to make certi-
fication to the Attorney General and the Secretary of State as to
the availability of American workers and the effect of the alien's
wage on the wages and working conditions of similarly employed
14 See Braude v. Wirtz, 350 F.2d 702 (9th Cir. 1965).
Is Reddy, Inc., 492 F.2d at 543.
16 8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(14) (1970).
17 8 U.S.C. § 1101-1503 (1970).
1- 8 U.S.C. § 1153(a)(1)-(6) (1970).
19 Scully, Is the Door Open Again? - A Survey of Our New Immigration Law, 13
U.C.L.A. L. REV. 227 (1966).
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workers. 20 The purpose of this provision of the Immigration and
Nationality Act was to protect the United States from the influx
of foreign labor in localities where there are not enough jobs for
such labor.21  The statute, although encompassing aliens seeking
to enter the United States, extends to nonresident aliens already
in the country who are applying for adjustment of their status to
that of resident. In cases of employment certification the non-
resident alien is considered to be an alien seeking admission to the
United States and therefore he must comply with the procedure
required for admission. 22
The decision of the Secretary of Labor regarding an alien's
employment certification is an administrative one subject to the
judicial review rules of the A.P.A. Judicial review is available if
a person has suffered a legal wrong or has been adversely af-
fected by the administrative decision, with the exception of cases
where judicial review is precluded by statute or where agency ac-
tion is committed to agency discretion.23 With respect to em-
ployment certification the courts will allow review where there is
an abuse of agency discretion.24
THE RIGHT TO JUDICIAL REVIEW OF THE
DECISION OF THE SECRETARY OF LABOR
Denial of Employment Certification to the Alien
Before His Entry into the United States
One recurring fact pattern in cases of employment certifica-
tion for an immigrant visa is that of an alien seeking entry as a
professional or as a skilled laborer, who has not yet entered the
United States, nor is on his way to the country. Such an alien
must receive the employment certification before he may apply for
a visa at the American Consulate. 2s  If such an alien is denied
employment certification and asks for judicial review of the deci-
sion of the Secretary of Labor, the courts will first question wheth-
er the alien has standing to bring such an action, before the question
20 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(14) (1970).
21 Cobb v. Murrell, 386 F.2d 947 (5th Cir. 1967); Scully, supra note 19.
21 Talanoa v. Immigration and Naturalization Serv., 397 F.2d 196, 200 (9th
Cir. 1968).
23 5 U.S.C. % 701-02 (1970).
24 Ozbirman v. Regional Manpower Adm'r, 335 F. Supp. 467, 470 (S.D. N.Y.
1971).
25 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(14) (1970).
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of jurisdiction of the court is addressed.26 As a general rule the
courts will grant no review in such cases. 27
The reason the courts will not grant review stems from the
concepts of the rights of aliens who are not in the country. An
unadmitted alien, according to the United States Supreme
Court, 28 does not have the right to enter or remain in the United
States. Therefore, the alien cannot ask for review on the theory
that his right to enter was violated. Furthermore, due process is
guaranteed by the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments of the
United States Constitution only to persons within the jurisdiction
of the United States. 29  As such, the alien may not argue that
his due process right was violated by an unfair proceeding, and he
has no standing. Consequently, the courts are unable to grant re-
view in cases where aliens outside of and not on their way to the
United States are denied employment certification by the Secre-
tary of Labor. This was first stated as dictum in Brownell v. Tom
We Shung,30 and this dictum became the holding of Braude v.
Wirtz, 31 where the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals refused to re-
view the denial by the Secretary of Labor of employment certifi-
cation to 181 Mexican workers who were still in Mexico. The
court was unable to find, and appellant workers were unable to
cite, any cases where aliens outside the United States were
granted judicial review for a denial of employment certification.
Because no constitutional rights of the aliens are involved in
such a case, the matter is purely administrative. As the court
stated in Cobb v. Murrell, a case of denial of employment certifica-
tion to a Mexican maid still in Mexico:
Thus we are in agreement with the Ninth Circuit specific
holding in Braude that aliens outside the country have no stand-
ing to challenge a determination of the Secretary of Labor that
their entry would adversely affect wages and working condi-
tions of workers in the United States. Courts are not univer-
sal monitors and ombundsmen of the administrative apparatus
of government. When constitutional rights will not be vio-
lated, Congress can make an administrative officer the apogee
a3 See Reddy, Inc., 492 F.2d at 538; Cobb, 386 F.2d at 947; Braude, 350 F.2d
at 702.
27 E.g., Cobb, 386 F.2d at 947.
28 United States ex rel. Knauffv. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537 (1950).
21 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
30 Brownell v. Tom We Shung, 352 U.S. 184 (1956).
31 Braude, 350 F.2d 702.
-1975]
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of finality, and no constitutional safeguard requires judicial
review in denying entry to aliens. (Emphasis supplied)32
The courts have taken a different attitude regarding the ex-
clusion of an alien who has a visa and has presented himself at
the border to enter in the United States. In 1956 the United
States Supreme Court extended the courts' jurisdiction regarding
this type of case by holding that the order of exclusion may be
challenged by a declaratory judgment, and not only by a habeas
corpus proceeding.33  Because of this expansion, Congress by
legislation limited the Court's holding in 1961, leaving a habeas
corpus proceeding as the sole recourse of an alien who has been
excluded. 34  This statute, however, has been interpreted by the
courts as limiting the habeas corpus proceedings not only to final
exclusion orders of any alien but also to aliens seeking admission
at the borders of the country. 3  This attitude of the courts in fa-
vor of granting review to aliens who have presented themselves
at the borders of the country is not, however, a novel one. Since
1956, when the Supreme Court expanded its jurisdiction to grant
declaratory judgments in exclusion cases, the Court has held that the
alien had to present himself at the borders of the United States to
receive the benefit of declaratory judgment. 6  Today, the alien
who presents himself at the border and is excluded, or who is on a
ship on his way to the United States and is excluded, has a right
only to a habeas corpus proceeding. He is, however, the only
alien outside the United States who may be granted some type of
judicial proceeding.
Denial of Employment Certification to the Nonresident Alien
Who Is in the United States
If an alien is within the United States, the courts will view
differently the denial of employment certification by the Secre-
tary of Labor. As Justice Murphy said in Bridges v. Wixon: "The
Bill of Rights is a futile authority for the alien seeking admission
for the first time to these shores. But once an alien enters and
resides in this country he becomes invested by the rights guaran-
32 Cobb, 386 F.2d at 951.
33 Brownell, 352 U.S. at 180.
34 8 U.S.C. % 1105(a)-(b) (1970).
35 See Brownell, 352 U.S. 180; Braude, 350 F.2d 702.
36 Brownell, 352 F.2d at 183-185.
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teed by the Constitution to all people within our borders." 37
Therefore, the alien who is within the country has standing, being
entitled to due process under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amend-
ments38 and also because his right to work has been violated
with the denial of employment certification. 39
Another problem is presented by the question of standing un-
der the A.P.A. The Act states that for a person to have standing
to challenge an administrative decision in court, such as denial of
the employment certification, he must have suffered a legal
wrong or be adversely affected by such a decision.40 Legal wrong
is the violation of a common law right, or "an interest created by
the Constitution or by statute.-41
An alien in the United States who is denied employment certi-
fication may allege that he suffered legal wrong and that he is ad-
versely affected:42
For an alien like the plaintiff, uprooted from his homeland,
and thousands of miles away, with the requisite employment
relationship established, the adverse administrative ruling is
the direct cause of his grievance under the statute. 43
The alien, therefore, who is in the country and asks for an employ-
ment certification and is denied it, has standing to seek judicial
review of his case. On this basis the Fifth Circuit, Court of Ap-
peals distinguished its previous decision in Cobb, where judicial re-
view of a denial of an employment certification was refused, from
its recent decision in Reddy, where review was granted. In Cobb
the alien was not in the country while in Reddy the alien was in
the United States. The significance of the distinction is that an
alien outside the United States does not have standing for judicial
review of an adverse decision by the Secretary of Labor.
After deciding the question of standing, the issue of jurisdic-
tion of the courts arises. The employment certification involves
administrative discretion. 44  According to the A.P.A. courts have
no jurisdiction to review administrative decisions which require
37 Bridges v. Wixon, 326 U.S. 135, 161 (1945) (Murphy, J., concurring).
31 U.S. CONST. amends. V & XIV.
39 Reddy, Inc., 492 F.2d at 543.
40 5 U.S.C. § 702 (1970).
41 Horn Sin v. Esperdy, 239 F. Supp. 903, 905 (S.D. N.Y. 1965), citing Ala.
Power Co. v. Ickes, 302 U.S. 464 (1938).
42 Reddy, Inc., 492 F.2d at 543.
13 Hom Sin, 239 F. Supp. at 906.
44 Ozbirman, 335 F. Supp. at 470.
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administrative discretion4 5  However, the courts have allowed
judicial review of such cases when, for example, there is abuse of
discretion, arbitrary classification, or erroneous implementation
of the statute. 46 The courts review adverse decisions of the Secre-
tary of Labor regarding aliens on the abuse of discretion theory.41
According to the test set forth in Digilab, Inc. t. Secretary of La-
bor,48 the Secretary of Labor abuses his discretion "if there is no
evidence to support the decision or if the decision is based on an
improper understanding of the law. '"4 9  Whenever the Secretary's
decision does not have a rational basis there is abuse of discretion
and the case is remanded. Under the abuse of discretion theory
the courts determine their jurisdiction by deciding the case on its
merits.5 0
In determining the jurisdiction of the court, Reddy followed a
different theory. The court applied a broad interpretation to the
A.P.A. section which states that judicial review of administrative
decisions is allowed except where "statutes preclude judicial re-
view,$ or "agency action is committed to agency discretion, "51
and that according to this section judicial review of administrative
decisions is prohibited only if there is clear and convincing evi-
dence of legislative intent against judicial review.5 2
In the Immigration and Nationality Acts3 the Reddy court
found no provision against judicial review, nor any special pro-
cedure for review of decisions of the Secretary of Labor denying
employment certification. The only immigration orders for which
the Act establishes a strict review procedure are the final orders
45 5 U.S.C. § 701(a)(2) (1970).
46 Ozbirman, 335 F. Supp. at 470-71.
17 See First Girl, Inc. v. Regional Manpower Adm'r, 361 F. Supp. 1339 (N.D.
II. 1973); Digilab, Inc. v. Secretary of Labor, 357 F. Supp. 941 (D. Mass. 1973);
Ozbirman, 335 F. Supp. at 467; Golabek v. Regional Manpower Adm'r, 329 F.
Supp. 892 (E.D. Pa. 1971). The abuse of discretion theory is also used to review
cases involving the denial of a visa to an alien by the immigration authorities. See
Song Jook Suh v. Rosenberg, 487 F.2d 1098 (9th Cir. 1971); Roumeliotis v. Immi-
gration and Naturalization Serv., 304 F.2d 453 (7th Cir. 1962).
48 Digilab, Inc., 357 F. Supp. 941.
41 Song Jook Sub, 437 F.2d at 1102.
50 See Ozbirman, 335 F. Supp. at 470-71.
51 5 U.S.C. § 701 (1970).
52 Reddy, Inc., 492 F.2d at 543. There is a trend in recent cases to follow this
theory. The courts have interpreted the exemption from judicial review because of
administrative discretion to be a narrow one. See Ramayake v. Mack, 499 F.2d
1207 (8th Cir. 1974). See also, Secretary of Labor v. Farino, 490 F.2d 885 (7th Cir.
1973).
53 8 U.S.C. % 1101-1153 (1970).
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of deportation and exclusion. The labor certification does not
come under these orders. Therefore, once it determined there was
no contrary legislative intent in the statute or the legislative history,
the court decided that it had jurisdiction to review the case. 54
The theory of jurisdiction presented in Reddy is more liberal
than the abuse of discretion theory. The significance of Reddy is
that courts may have jurisdiction to review any final decision of
the Secretary of Labor denying employment certification to an
alien.
A Prospective Employer's Challenging of the
Decision of the Secretary of Labor
The prospective employer of an alien has sometimes joined in
court action or brought his own action against the decision of the
Secretary of Labor.55  There is, however, a question of whether
prospective employers can bring an action against the Secretary of
Labor.
In Cobb the court held that the employer cannot bring an ac-
tion by himself.56 However, Cobb involved a Mexican maid still
in Mexico who did not join in the action challenging the denial of
employment certification; because the employer could not show
that lie had suffered legal wrong himself, no review was granted.
A similar result was reached in Braude, where the court held that
the agricultural corporations challenging the denial of employ-
ment certification to their prospective Mexican employees had
not suffered a legal wrong, and therefore had no standing.57
Cobb presents a solution to avoid the problem of the prospec-
tive employer's standing in cases where the alien is applying for
a quota visa58 by applying a special provision of the Immigra-
tion Act.59 According to this provision, the employer can apply
to the Attorney General for a preference of the employee within
54 Reddy, Inc., 492 F.2d at 543. The dissent in this case used the abuse of
discretion theory in discussing the case on its merits. Id. at 545-46.
55 Employers joined in the action brought by the aliens in Reddy, Braude,
Pesikoff, and Xytex. Employers brought their own action in First Girl, Cobb, and
Farino.
56 Cobb, 386 F.2d at 951-52.
57 Braude, 350 F,2d at 706-08.
58 8 U.S.C. § 1154(a) (1970). Although the quota system does not exist to-
day, the employer's petition for preference status still exists for aliens subject to
numerical limitations. Cobb, 386 F.2d at 951 n.6.
51 Cobb, 386 F.2d at 951-52.
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the quota of the employee's country. If the Attorney General is
convinced the alien is urgently needed he will adjust his status.60
In recent decisions the courts have upheld the employer's
standing to ask for review of a denial of employment certifica-
tion. In Pesikoff v. Secretary of Labor, where the employer's appli-
cation for labor certification for a live-in maid still in Mexico was
denied by the Labor Department, 61 the court held that the em-
ployer had standing to bring the action, on the basis of a two-step
test: first, the employer must allege that the denial of certifica-
tion has caused him an injury in fact, and secondly, the injury
must be to an interest protected or regulated by the statute provid-
ing for the certification.62  In Pesikoff the court held that the em-
ployer's allegation of not being able to find a live-in maid was an
injury in fact, and that the injury was to the interest of American
employers to find qualified employees, which interest is protected
by the Immigration and Naturalization Act.6 3
Finally, some recent decisions have not been concerned with
such procedural problems as the employer's standing. In First
Girl, Inc. v. Regional Manpower Administration of U.S. Department of
Labor,64 where the company was denied employment certifica-
tion by the Labor Department for three English stenographers, the
company's standing was not discussed at all, and review was al-
lowed.
REVIEWING THE DECISION OF THE SECRETARY OF LABOR
ON ITS MERITS
The Requirement of Availability of American Workers
As previously mentioned, the first determination the Secretary
of Labor must make in order to grant employment certification to
an alien is whether:
[t]here are not sufficient workers in the United States who are
able, willing, qualified and, available at the time of the applica-
tion for a visa and admission to the United States and at the
60 This trend is the result of a new interpretation of the A.P.A. by the Supreme
Court regarding standing in Ass'n of Data Processing Serv. Organizations v.
Camp, 397 U.S. 150 (1970).
61 Pesikoff v. Secretary of Labor, 501 F.2d 757, 761 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
62 This test replaces the former legal right test under which Cobb and Braude
were decided.
63 Ass'n of Data Serv. Processing Organizations, 397 U.S. at 150.
64 First Girl, Inc., 361 F. Supp. at 1339.
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place to which the alien is destined to perform such skilled or
unskilled labor.65
The courts have strictly construed this provision. In the first
place they require that the workers are not only "available," but
also that those workers are "able," "willing," and "qualified" to
work. In Golabek v. Regional Manpower Administration, U.S. De-
partment of Labor, the alien was the only one of three applicants for
a Philadelphia parochial school job who was interested in the posi-
tion.66  The court reversed the decision of the Secretary of Labor
who had denied employment certification on the basis of avail-
ability of workers. That the other applicants were not interested
in the job was a pivotal consideration in the court's decision:
There are not facts on the record which indicate to us that pe-
titioner is likely to displace any American workers. In addi-
tion, although the Administrator found that there might be
qualified and available applicants, there is nothing to indicate
that those applicants would be "able and willing" to work for
the Archdiocese. 67
A second important consideration concerning the availability of
workers focuses upon the time at which the availability of workers
is to be determined. The statute requires that the determination
be made at the time of application.68 However, if there is a
reconsideration, and even more, if there is a review by the court
and a remand of the case, the question becomes whether the
availability at the time of the initial application or at the time of
the review should be considered the proper point for the determi-
nation. The court in Reddy held that:
[t]he inquiry under Section 1182 (a) (14) into the sufficiency of
workers is "at the time of application," an inquiry hardly sus-
ceptible of retrospective determination. Necessarily the De-
partment's reconsideration must be in the light of the facts
existent at the time of reconsideration, with respect to both
6S 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(14) (1970).
66 Golabek, 329 F. Supp. at 895.
67 Id. In Digilab, where the administrative record listed 200 electrical engineers
without indication whether they were able, willing, qualified, and available, the
court reversed the denial of certification by the Labor Department because of non-
compliance with the requirements of the statute. 357 F. Supp. at 944. In First Girl,
where the employer had made unsuccessful efforts to obtain personnel through
advertisement, the court reversed the negative determination of the Secretary of
Labor regarding the availability of workers, because, the court stated, there were
no workers available. 361 F. Supp. at 1349-41.
68 Reddy, Inc., 492 F.2d at 545.
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sufficiency of workers and adverse effect on wages and work-
ing conditions of workers similarly employed.69
A final consideration regarding the availability of workers is
the place of employment. The administrative rules state that the
availability of workers at the place of employment should be the
concern of the Secretary of Labor.7°  For this reason, the deter-
mination is delegated to the Regional Manpower Administra-
tors.7 ' The courts, however, may intervene if the Secretary of
Labor applies an erroneous standard regarding the place of deter-
mination. In Reddy,72 the court reversed the determination be-
cause the reviewing officer erred with regard to the place of de-
termination by considering the workers available in the United States
and not in Dallas, Texas, where the alien was seeking employ-
ment.
In considering all elements of the availability of workers for
provision of the employment certification, the courts will continue
to review the Secretary's application of. the statute and whether he
strictly followed the requirements of the provision.
Adverse Effect of the Employment of the Alien
on American Workers
Another determination that the Secretary of Labor will have to
make in order to grant employment certification to an alien is
whether the employment of the alien will "adversely affect the
wages and working conditions of the workers in the United States
similarly employed. "73
The first problem related to this consideration is how an
alien's work adversely affects American workers. The court dealt
with the question extensively in Ozbirman v. Regional Manpower
69 Id.
70 29 C.F.R. § 60.1 (1974).
71 29 C.F.R. § 60.3(b) (1974).
72 Reddy, Inc., 492 F.2d at 538. In Ozbirman, where the alien argued "place of
employment" means the specific situs of a specific employer and not a geographic
region, the court, in ruling against this argument, pointed out why the geographic
region determination is preferable:
The plaintiff's determination of "place" would require the Department
of Labor to compile statistics of employment availability for millions
of employers. Such a requirement would indeed be a burden on the
Department of Labor and would be "disruptive to the normal flow of
immigration."
335 F. Supp. at 467, 473-74.
13 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(14) (1970).
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Administration, U.S. Department of Labor,74 where the plaintiff had
been denied employment certification because the Secretary of
Labor had determined that the salary offered to the alien did not
meet the prevailing wage. The court, in reversing the determina-
tion, stated that the "adverse effect" is "a box of variables," 75
and should be measured not only by the prevailing wage, but
also by such variables as shorter work hours, unique vacations,
proximity to home, better working conditions, and other fringe
benefits which can overcome the problem of lower wages. The
court concluded:
Any determination of adverse effect on wages should be scru-
tinized and balanced in light of the variables which enter into
the job offer. In this way the purpose of Congress in protect-
ing the American Labor market could be implemented in light
of realistic employment factors.76
In order to avoid overburdening of the Secretary of Labor with
detailed determinations of many factors, the Ozbirman court stated
that it is the Secretary of Labor who "should determine which
factors play a major role in affecting wage rates and consider them
as a package." 77
A factor to which the courts give a great deal of attention
in balancing the adverse effect of a lower wage rate is labor union
approval of the wage and benefits of the alien. In Ozbirman, the
court stated that the wage of the alien would not have an adverse
effect on similarly employed workers by emphasizing the fact that
the proposed wage met the union standards, although it did not
meet the prevailing wage. 78  In Golabek, an important factor for
the court in reversing the Secretary of Labor's determination that
the parochial school wage offered to the alien did not meet the
public school prevailing wage was that parochial school wage
rates were union approved. The union's purpose in this regard
was to protect the labor market. Since this corresponds to the
legislative intent of the adverse effect provision, when the union
approves the wage the legislative intent is fulfilled.79
74 Ozbirman, 335 F. Supp. at 467.
75 Id. at 471.
76 Id. at 472.
77 Id. at 472 n.5.
71 Ozbirman, 335 F. Supp. at 472-73.
19 Id. The court stated:
A primary factor in achieving adequate wages for laborers in this
country has been the effect of unions. To affirm the decision of the
1975]
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The second issue arising under this provision of the statute is
the notion of "similarly employed" workers. The statute states
that the determination must be as to the adverse effect on wages
and working conditions of similarly employed workers.8° To de-
termine the effect on the similarly employed workers the Secre-
tary of Labor must determine the prevailing wage "for certain
classifications of labor in a particular area."81 The courts have
been very strict in requiring that the labor classification, which
will be the total of "similarly employed" workers, include only
workers of precisely the same job as the one offered to the alien.
Applying a strict standard, the court in Golabek reversed the deter-
mination of adverse effect made by the Secretary of Labor, where
the determination dealt with public school teachers, while the job
offered to the alien was that of a parochial school teacher. The
court, in ruling that the Secretary erred in his classification, stated
that:
The wage scale of teachers in the Philadelphia public schools
cannot be placed in the same group as that for teachers in
Philadelphia's parochial schools. The classroom and school
situation is different and there may be any number of reasons
why a teacher would prefer to work in one school system rather
than the other. 82
In First Girl there was a reversal of the Secretary of Labor's de-
termination that the alien's job would adversely affect similarly
employed workers, where the aliens would be temporary secre-
taries and the determination was made on the basis of the wages of
ordinary secretaries. The court held that because of the special
temporary assignments, different offices and unsteady work hours,
the aliens could not be classified as similarly employed with
ordinary secretaries. 83
In Reddy, the Secretary of Labor classified the alien as a
mechanical engineer, which was the type of job the alien would
perform, but in measuring the availability of workers and the ad-
verse effect of his employment on these workers he classified the
alien as a civil engineer, which was the job he was educated for at
Secretary of Labor would require this court to ignore the fact that
labor unions attempt to obtain the most the market will bear for their
members through collective bargaining.
id. at 472.
In 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(14) (1970).
S1 Golabek, 329 F. Supp. at 895.
82 Id. at 895-96.
13 First Girl, Inc., 361 F. Supp. at 1341.
[Vol. 7: 229
DENIAL OF EMPLOYMENT
school." Asking for consistency of classification in the deter-
minations, the Reddy court ruled against the civil engineer classi-
fication and added:
If appellant were trained in the ministry, but performing light
gauge steel work, the relevant wages and working conditions of
"the workers in the United States similarly employed" would
be those of persons performing light gauge steel work, which by
the Department's definition is mechanical engineer's work,
and not the wages and working conditions of ministers. 85
However, the courts have placed limits on the classification
of labor. In Ozbirman the court held that individual differences
cannot be taken into consideration in creating a separate class of
workers. The Secretary of Labor can require that workers only
meet the "threshold requirements" for the job, and he may disre-
gard the subclasses based on the appellant's background. The
court, however, did not specify what these "threshold require-
ments" are. 81
In contrast to Ozbirman, the court in Reddy based its decision
on the fact that the alien was a civil engineer with a special back-
ground. 8  He was a design specialist in light gauge metal
work. Dissenting Judge Clark, however, warned that the classi-
fication was based on individual background and not on meeting
the general job qualifications, and that:
Reddy created the description of a unique combination of skills
which were really job acquired talents rather than qualifica-
tions for employment . . . . adopted them as pre-requirements
for its job, and then sought certification for Dhekney upon its
failure to find any other individual with such a novel combina-
tion of skills.18
The courts have followed a strict, but reasonable interpreta-
tion of the requirements for an alien's labor certification. If
the Secretary of Labor does not follow the statute in haec verba
the courts will rule against the determination, holding it arbi-
trary.89
m Reddy, Inc., 492 F.2d at 544-45.
16 Id. at 545.
"I Ozbirman, 335 F. Supp. at 473.
87 Reddy, Inc., 492 F.2d at 540.
88 Id. at 546 (dissenting opinion). The Court in Xytex, however, held that ex-
perience acquired by the alien during his part-time job at the employer's corpora-
tion should be considered in determining the alien's qualifications for the
position. 382 F. Supp. at 53.
89 Reddy, Inc., 492 F.2d at 546.
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CONCLUSION
The immigration laws of the United States have made it dif-
ficult for an alien to stay in this country. The high rate of un-
employment within the United States could be considered a good
reason for the Secretary of Labor to use the immigration laws to
deny employment certification to aliens. But the purpose of the
statutory requirement for employment certification is not to re-
duce the number of immigrants. Its purpose, as Senator Ken-
nedy advocated in introducing the Act, is to increase the quality of
immigrants. ° It would seem rather illogical to deny employment
certification to a highly specialized engineer, teacher, or lawyer
only because there are people of the same profession available,
but who are not trained in his special field.
The courts have been faithful to the intent of the legislature.
They have granted review where the alien is in the United States
and has asked for an employment certification to adjust his status
from nonresident to immigrant, and they have reversed the re-
manded arbitrary decisions of the Secretary of Labor denying aliens
the right to work.
The courts may have been sympathetic toward an alien's desire
to stay and work in the United States, but their determination of
the arbitrariness of the Secretary of Labor's decisions have been
within reasonable limits. Where the denial of employment certifi-
cation is a reasonable result reached by the Secretary of Labor,
the courts will uphold it, because:
[w]ounded or bruised feelings may be painful, but we do not
have a legal right to be free of all insensitive, illogical or unrea-
sonable hurts. Not all wounds are nursed by courts.91
ANASTASIUs EFSTRATIADES*
90 11 CONG. REC. 24227 (1965).
91 Cobb, 386 F.2d at 952-53.
* J.D. candidate, Villanova University, 1976
[Vol. 7: 229 -
